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ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the issue of the most cost-effective way of 
improving access to education for poor households in developing countries. We consider 
two alternatives: (1) extensive expansion of the school system (i.e., bringing education to 
the poor) and (2) subsidizing investment in education by the poor (i.e., bringing the poor 
to the education system). To this end, we evaluate the Programa Nacional de Educación, 
Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA), a large poverty alleviation program recently 
introduced in Mexico that subsidizes education. Using double-difference regression 
estimators on data collected before and after the program for randomly selected control 
and treatment households, we estimate the relative impacts of the demand- and supply-
side program components. Combining these estimates with cost information, we find that 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a vast body of literature that identifies the expansion of formal education 
as a key component of successful development strategies (Schultz 1988; Psacharopoulos 
1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). In spite of this general consensus, there is still 
much disagreement about how best to allocate scarce public resources within the 
education sector. In a recent survey of the empirical literature on education, Hanushek 
(1995) identified school quality as the important constraint toward increasing education 
levels. But, in a reply based on the same empirical literature, Kremer (1995) argues that, 
while quality is undoubtedly important, there is no evidence that improving quality is 
more important than opening new schools in isolated areas or subsidizing the cost of 
schooling to allow more people to attend. Thus, this debate regarding the relative 
importance of improved school quality vis-à-vis improved school access appears to be far 
from settled. 
The quality versus access debate is about the issue of the most cost-effective way 
of achieving a given total years of education. Yet concerns for equity—the distribution of 
education across different income groups—is a strong motivating factor underlying 
government intervention in the education sector. Since economies of scale imply that it is 
generally more cost-effective to locate schools in relatively densely populated areas, 
poorer households, which tend to be disproportionately located in remote areas, may face 
substantially higher private costs and, as a result, tend to acquire lower education levels.   2
This may be further exacerbated by the relative importance of credit market failures for 
poorer households.  
In this paper we are concerned with the issue of the most cost-effective way of 
improving access to education for poor households in developing countries. We consider 
two alternatives, namely, (1) extensive expansion of the school system (bringing 
education to the poor), and (2) subsidizing investment in education by the poor (bringing 
the poor into the education system). To this end, we evaluate a relatively unique and large 
program recently introduced in Mexico that subsidizes education. To our knowledge, this 
is one of the first studies that rigorously analyzes the relative cost-effectiveness of 
demand- versus supply-side subsidies in the context of a developing country.  
The program we analyze, the Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud y 
Alimentación (PROGRESA), was introduced by the Mexican government in 1997. The 
program subsidizes investment in human capital by poor households by conditioning cash 
transfers to families on their enrolling their children in school and making regular trips to 
health clinics. There is also a supply-side component to the program with resources 
allocated toward improving school quality and access (e.g., more teachers, health clinic 
staff, higher salaries, and extensive expansion). PROGRESA has grown rapidly, and by 
the end of 2000, the program was providing benefits to 2.6 million of the poorest families 
in rural Mexico, corresponding to about 40 percent of all rural families and nearly 12 
percent of all families in Mexico. The idea of linking monetary transfers to human capital 
investment has become a model for other countries: similar programs are underway in   3
Bangladesh, Honduras, and Nicaragua and are in the planning stages in Argentina, 
Colombia, and Jamaica.  
We analyze the cost effectiveness of the secondary education component of 
PROGRESA, based on the program goal of increasing school enrollment at the secondary 
level (grades 7–9).
1 In the poor communities where PROGRESA operates, only about 
half of all children continues to secondary school after primary (grades 1–6). This paper 
compares the cost-effectiveness of the PROGRESA transfers (educational grants) to the 
policy of constructing new schools. We use household-level data as well as data on 
supply and costs to separate the supply-side from the demand-side impact and derive the 
cost of each part accordingly. We show that the demand-side component is a much more 
cost-effective way of increasing education levels relative to building additional schools. 
Our evidence is derived from unique panel data of children in poor rural 
communities in Mexico. The communities formed part of a social experiment where 
communities were allocated between “control” and “treatment” groups to receive 
PROGRESA benefits. Baseline and follow-up data were collected from households in 
both sets of communities, but the program was implemented only in the treatment 
localities during the period this information was collected. We combine this data with 
information on the cost of transfers as well as data from the Secretary of Public 
                                                 
1 Two previous studies (Schultz 2000; Behrman, Sengupta and Todd 2001)  focused on identifying the 
overall impact of  PROGRESA on educational outcomes, including enrollment, progression, and return 
rates. Although such impact analyses constitute a crucial input into any economic evaluation of the 
program, knowledge of impact by itself may be insufficient for policymakers concerned with allocating 
scarce public resources between competing alternatives. There may be many alternative ways of achieving 
a given impact, but with costs differing substantially across these alternatives.   4
Education on the cost of building schools. These data allow us to both identify program 
impacts precisely as well as carry out a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis.  
The format of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the program design. 
Section 3 describes the strategy for estimation as well as the data. Section 4 estimates the 
program impact on enrollment, differentiating between the demand- and supply-side 
components. Section 5 presents the cost-effectiveness analysis and Section 6 summarizes 
and qualifies the results. 
 
2. PROGRAM DESIGN 
PROGRESA, a large poverty alleviation program in Mexico begun in 1997, 
targets its benefits directly to the population in extreme poverty in rural areas.
2 It 
currently operates in over 50,000 localities in 31 states, with a budget of nearly $1.3 
billion for 2001. The program is made up of three closely linked components (education, 
health, and nutrition) based on the belief that there are positive interactions between the 
three. Our analysis concentrates on the education component, which we now briefly 
describe.  
Under the education component, the program provides monetary education grants 
for each child less than 18 years of age enrolled in school between the third grade of 
                                                 
2 Beneficiaries are selected through a three-stage targeting mechanism. First, using national census data, 
geographic targeting is applied to select the most marginal communities. Second, socioeconomic data are 
collected from all households in the most marginal communities. Using income and other data ( e.g., 
education, housing conditions, and durable goods), discriminant analysis is used to identify “poor” 
households. Finally, community feedback is used to reclassify households. See Skoufias, Davis, and de la 
Vega (2001) for details.    5
primary and the third grade of secondary school (Table 1). In order to compensate for the 
forgone income that children would otherwise contribute to their families if they were 
working, the grant amounts increase as children progress to higher grades. Additionally, 
at the secondary school level (junior high), the grants are slightly higher for girls than for 
boys. In the second half of 1999, the amounts of the monthly educational grants ranged 
from $80 (Mexican pesos
3) in the third grade of primary to $265 for boys and $305 for 
girls in the third year of secondary school. 
 
Table 1—Monthly education subsidy rates (pesos), July–December 1999 
  Males  Females 
     
Primary     
 - Grade 3  80  80 
 - Grade 4  95  95 
 - Grade 5    125  125 
 - Grade 6  165  165 
 - Supplies  100 (per semester)  100 (per semester) 
     
Secondary     
 - Grade 7  240  250 
 - Grade 8  250  280 
 - Grade 9  265  305 
 - Supplies  190 (per semester)  190 (per semester) 
     
Note: The maximum monthly transfer that households can receive is $750. Subsidy rates are indexed to 
inflation every six months. 
 
 
In order to provide incentives for human-capital accumulation, benefits are 
contingent on fulfillment of certain obligations by the beneficiary families. Grants are 
                                                 
3 We use the symbol $ to denote Mexican pesos. The exchange rate in 1999 was approximately 10 pesos 
per U.S. dollar.    6
linked to school attendance of children: if a child unjustifiably misses more than 15 
percent of school days in a month, the family will not receive the grant that month. All of 
the benefits are given directly to the mother of the family, with a maximum monthly limit 
of $750 per family. Average monthly benefits are currently $255, equivalent to about 22 
percent of the monthly income of beneficiary families. After three years, families may 
renew their status as beneficiaries, subject to a reevaluation of their socioeconomic 
conditions. On the supply side, extra resources are made available to schools serving the 
beneficiary communities to compensate for the expected increase in demand generated by 
the program, thus helping to avoid negative congestion externalities. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA 
The empirical analysis in this paper has several parts. First, we estimate the 
overall impact of the program (i.e., the combined demand- and supply-side components) 
on secondary school enrollment. Then, using two sources of data, (1) household-level 
data generated from a natural experiment designed for the evaluation of PROGRESA, 
and (2) school-level data collected separately from the Secretary of Public Education, we 
estimate the separate impacts of demand-side subsidies and of increased supply on school 
enrollment. We combine these estimated impacts with an analysis of program costs to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of grants versus construction of secondary schools as 
alternative strategies for promoting secondary school enrollment. We now briefly 
describe the data sources.   7
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL DATA FROM PROGRESA EVALUATION 
Specifically for the purposes of program evaluation, PROGRESA carried out a 
social experiment in which a random sample of 506 eligible communities was selected 
from the seven states where the program was first implemented. Communities were 
randomly assigned to a treatment group (320 communities that received transfers) and a 
control group (186 communities that would receive benefits about two years later). All of 
the 24,077 households in both treatment and control communities were surveyed prior to 
implementation of the program. This baseline household census, containing information 
on households’ socioeconomic characteristics, was collected in November 1997 
(ENCASEH97: Encuesta de Características Socio-económicos de los Hogares). 
Households in the treatment group began to receive benefits in March 1998. Periodic 
follow-up surveys (ENCEL-Encuesta de Evaluación) were carried out after program 
implementation approximately every six months. These surveys include information on 
numerous topics, including education, health utilization, household expenditure, women’s 
status, and community indicators. In our analysis, we use the ENCASEH and two post-
program rounds of the ENCEL, namely the October 1998 and November 1999 rounds. 
Behrman and Todd (1999) evaluate the success of the randomization and find that 
characteristics do not systematically differ at the community level. 
 
SUPPLY DATA 
As we noted earlier, concomitant with the monetary transfers of PROGRESA, 
there was an extensive expansion of supply aimed at improving (or at least avoiding a   8
deterioration in) the quality of schooling. Without this component, it might be expected 
that overall school quality might decrease, given that increasing enrollment due to the 
program would likely increase variables such as the student-teacher ratio. In this section, 
we describe the relevant supply variables across control and treatment communities for 
each of the three sample years. Data on school characteristics come from the Secretary of 
Public Education (SEP), which collects information on all schools nationwide. 
Using GIS software, we identify the nearest secondary school to each community 
and match its characteristics to each child, including the distance to the school (in 
kilometers). We thus assume that the available supply for this child can be captured by 
the characteristics of the closest school. If a school is located within the community 
where the child lives, this distance is registered as 0 kilometers. Less than a third of our 
sample of children have a secondary school inside their community.
4 For each school we 
have the following information: number of students enrolled in grades 7 through 9, 
number of teachers, teachers’ average education level, number of classrooms, percentage 
of children who failed between one and five classes during the previous year, number of 
classrooms with more than one grade, type of school, and source of funding.  
Table 2 shows a clear decrease in distance to the nearest school in both control 
and treatment communities over time, consistent with school construction occurring over 
our time period of analysis. The year 1997 represents the situation before program 
                                                 
4 Note that the closest school to the child is not necessarily the school attended by the child, although this is 
the case in most instances. However, we believe that using characteristics of the closest school rather than 
the actual school attended is less problematic from the perspective of endogeneity.   9
implementation, whereas 1998 and 1999 represent the situation after program 
implementation. Overall, mean distance decreases from about 2.2 to 2.0 kilometers, both 
in treatment and control communities. Given the proximity of many control and treatment 
communities, it is likely that many children from both control and treatment communities 
attend the same schools. Therefore, extra resources to schools, to the extent they are 
given, are likely to benefit children in both sets of communities. This will have 
implications for how we identify demand- and supply-side effects of the program below, 
given the absence of an explicit “control” group for supply-side interventions. 
 
Table 2—Summary of supply-side data (means) 
    Treatment localities    Control localities 
Secondary school  1997  1998  1999    1997  1998  1999 
               
Distance to nearest school  2.21  2.13  2.04    2.22  2.17  1.98 
Telesecondary  0.88  0.88  0.88    0.91  0.92  0.90 
School enrollment  75.80  82.26  97.60    72.01  80.96  91.90 
Student-teacher ratio  22.06  23.57  24.17    22.91  23.51  25.23 
Student-classroom ratio  21.76  24.12  25.61    22.44  24.86  25.71 
Multiple classrooms  0.55  0.23  0.38     0.21  0.20  0.14 
Percent students failing  0.02  0.03  0.03    0.02  0.03  0.02 
Percent teachers with higher education  0.96  0.93  0.94    0.96  0.95  0.94 
Note: The numbers in the table are variable means and based on the panel sample of children on which 




Consistent with the presence of the program, we observe larger increases in 
school enrollment levels in treatment communities than in control communities. In spite 
of this, both the student-teacher and student-classroom ratios increase only slightly over   10
time, while the number of multi-grade classrooms (classrooms where more than one 
grade is being taught) decreases, all consistent with supply-side resources increasing to 
compensate for increases in demand. We also observe only very slight changes in the 
indicators of average educational attainment of teachers and the percentage of students 
reported as failing at least one class. All in all, the general picture is one of increasing 
demand being compensated for by matching supply-side resources. 
 
4. IDENTIFICATION OF PROGRAM IMPACTS 
Previous studies of PROGRESA have measured educational impact through 
simple mean comparisons between the treatment and control group or through regression 
analysis using a dummy variable to capture program eligibility (Schultz 2000). Note, 
however, that this method does not allow us to determine which part of the impact might 
be attributed to the education grants versus the improvements in supply made by the 
program. Our empirical strategy allows us to separate these effects. By including 
indicators of the supply of schooling over time in our sample, we should pick up the 
program impact that occurs through changing supply-side characteristics. If, in fact, part 
of the program impact on schooling results from supply-side changes, controlling for 
supply-side variables should result in a decrease in the estimated coefficient on the 
dummy variable for treatment-control compared to the regression without supply-side 
variables.    11
We start this section by generating a reference set of estimates of total program 
impact; these are comparable to those generated by the earlier work of Schultz (2000). 
We then separate out the total program impact into its supply- and demand-side impacts. 
Our estimations focus on the variable school enrollment,
5 which we then translate into an 
indicator of extra years of education due to the program.
6 
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF PROGRAM IMPACT 
To estimate the program impact on school enrollment, we construct double-
difference regression estimates using the ENCASEH97 survey as our baseline survey 
prior to program implementation and the subsequent ENCEL surveys. These estimators 
are based on comparing differences between the treatment and control groups before and 
after the program. Note that double-difference estimators have the advantage that any 
preprogram differences between the treatment and control groups are eliminated in the 
estimation of impacts. Under the assumption that any unobserved heterogeneity between 
                                                 
5 Other potential indicators are attendance levels and/or school performance. The available data have thus 
far shown little impact of PROGRESA on student test scores (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2000). 
Evaluation of school attendance has also shown little impact of PROGRESA on attendance rates; that is, 
once children are enrolled in school, they tend to attend regularly. 
6 We use an indirect approach (estimating years of extra schooling from enrollment impacts) rather than a 
more direct approach of directly estimating PROGRESA’s impact on years of completed schooling for two 
basic reasons. First, years of completed schooling is a longer-term measure of schooling achievement and 
its effect is likely to be underestimated using our data, which contains data for only 18 months after 
program implementation. Second, we have found substantial inconsistencies in the variable that measures 
highest grade completed. Whereas, between any two given school years, children should have either the 
same years of schooling or one additional year, the  data show that a large fraction of the sample has 
improbable progression patterns. Using enrollment rates to derive years of schooling invariably involves 
making some assumptions about completion rates. We assume that, once enrolled, a child completes the 
year, both in the treatment and control group. Note that this is likely to actually underestimate the impact of 
the program since PROGRESA has had some effect on increasing completion rates (Behrman, Sengupta, 
and Todd 2001).    12
the treatment and control groups is fixed over time, the double-difference estimator 
eliminates differences attributable to this heterogeneity. The empirical specification we 
use also contains a number of control variables, which may be useful for reducing any 
remaining statistical bias. 
 
Estimating the Total Program Impact 
We pool the three November surveys (ENCASEH97, ENCEL98N, and 
ENCEL99N), giving us three observations covering three different school years. Each 
round was carried out in the fall of each school year, that is, at the beginning of each 
school cycle. In our impact analysis, we allow the effect of the program to be different in 
each of the two post-program rounds, as might be the case if the program impacts 
decrease (or increase) over time. The regression equation that we estimate is the 
following: 
 





X R T R T T S e b a a a a ￿ ￿
= =




3 3 2 2 1 0  , 
where Sit represents whether the child i is enrolled in school in period t, Ti  represents a 
binary variable equal to 1 if individual i lives in a treatment community and 0 otherwise, 
Ris the round of the corresponding ENCEL survey, and Xjit represents the vector of J 
control variables for individual i in time t (described below).    13
Under this specification, the program impact over the various rounds of the 
evaluation survey is estimated by interacting the treatment dummy  i T with the round of 
the analysis  R (round 1 represents the baseline observation before implementation of the 
program whereas rounds 2 and 3 represent after-program rounds corresponding to the 
ENCEL of November 1998 and November 1999). Note that  1 a  is expected to be 
insignificantly different from zero (that is, preprogram differences prior to program 
implementation are expected to be zero) and the interaction terms represent the impact of 
being in a treatment community on school enrollment after program implementation. The 
intercept terms, a 0t, capture the fact that school enrollment may vary (for reasons 
unrelated to the program) over each round of the analysis. We include a number of other 
control variables, including a child’s age, mother and father education levels, marginality 




Adding Supply-Side Variables 
The regression framework used above, which estimates impact through the 
inclusion of a dummy variable measuring receipt or not of the program, cannot separate 
the effects of the demand- and supply-side components. As is, therefore, we cannot argue 
that the identified impact represents the effect of the subsidies as opposed to the 
improvements in supply. However, once we add supply indicators of schooling 
                                                 
7 Our results (available on request) are robust to various eligibility definitions and to using pooled 
(everyone in the sample at some point) as opposed to panel data (only those in all years).   14
(assuming that our data are of sufficient quality to, in fact, adequately capture supply-side 
changes), we should be able to isolate the effect of any improvements in supply over our 
period of analysis. If the effect of the program as measured by the dummy variable is 
reduced with the inclusion of the supply-side variables, this would imply that part of the 
enrollment impact attributed to the introduction of the program derives from 
improvements in the supply side in treatment relative to control communities.  
Adding supply indicators to our regression framework, our estimated equation 
becomes 
 











3 3 2 2 1 0  , 
where X kit represents the vector of K variables measuring supply of schooling and other 
variables are as before. 
The supply-side variables that we include are the following. First, we include 
distance to the closest secondary school and its square. This variable captures a number 
of aspects related to schooling. Distance clearly is a measure of both private financial and 
time costs incurred in attending school; a greater distance increases the private costs of 
attending school. But distance is also a supply measure of schools in the sense that the 
only way (excluding migration) that, for a given child, this distance can be reduced is 
through the construction of new schools. 
We include other supply-side variables that we hope will serve as proxies for the 
quality of education received. Since it is very difficult to specify with much confidence   15
how these variables combine with each other (or, indeed, with unobserved quality 
characteristics), we avoid focusing on specific coefficients. We therefore view these 
quality variables as jointly controlling for quality differences.  
The variables used to capture quality are as follows. We use information on the 
type of secondary school available. In the rural communities we analyze, the dominant 
type of secondary school is the “telesecondary.”
8 Therefore, we consider the enrollment 
impact of having a telesecondary as the nearest secondary school versus the alternative of 
other types of secondary schools (mainly technical). Nevertheless, there is likely a 
problem of endogenous school placement here; for instance, telesecondary schools may 
be found precisely in areas that tend to have low school enrollment caused by factors that 
are unobservable to the researcher (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986). This would tend to 
bias the estimated impact and thus our results should be interpreted as only suggestive. A 
variable capturing the education level of the teacher is also included, measured by the 
percentage of teachers with at least a high school education at the available secondary 
school. We also include an indicator that measures the percentage of children reported as 
failing at least one class in the previous year. 
Finally, we consider the impact of the student-teacher ratio on school enrollment. 
As DrPze and Kingdon (2001) have noted, it is inappropriate to assume that the student-
teacher ratio is exogenous as this will clearly be affected by the enrollment decisions in 
                                                 
8 About 90 percent of children attend telesecondary schools, which tend to be more basic than the larger 
technical secondary schools.  Telesecondary schools are thought to be a cost-effective manner to bring 
secondary schooling to rural areas. These are generally small buildings with a television, which shows (by 
satellite) daily videos on each subject matter ( e.g., math and Spanish). Instead of a teacher, there is an 
assistant to help children with exercises performed after seeing the videos.   16
communities. We use two strategies to address this issue. First, as in DrPze and Kingdon 
(2001), we include the potential student-teacher ratio (instead of the actual student-
teacher ratio), defined as the number of children under 17 years who have completed 
primary education. Second, we instrument the actual student-teacher ratio using the 
potential student-teacher ratio. As both approaches gave very similar results, we only 
report estimations based on the first strategy. 
 
IMPACT RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the total program impact of PROGRESA on 
secondary school enrollment.
9 From an average enrollment for boys in secondary school 
of 65 percent prior to the program, the results indicate an increase of about 8 percentage 
points in the fall of 1998, and are lower in 1999 at 5 percentage points. For girls, who had 
an initial secondary school enrollment of nearly 53 percent, the impacts are somewhat 
higher, with both years exhibiting an increase of about 11 to 12 percentage points. That 
is, by 1999, the program impact on secondary school enrollment for girls is around 
double the level for boys. The decrease in program impact for boys reflects the fact that 
many of those initially returning to school because of the grants subsequently drop out 
the following year.  
Table 3 also reports the results when we add the supply-side characteristics. 
Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the estimated coefficients on the program dummy 
                                                 
9 We do not include the full regression results; these are available upon request.   17
remain similar to those estimated previously without the inclusion of supply-side 
characteristics. In fact, in all cases, the program impact is slightly higher than previously, 
although not substantially higher. For the purpose of our cost-effectiveness analysis 
below, we focus on the lower estimates, since these may better reflect the extra years of 
education resulting from the program. 
 
Table 3—Program impact on enrollment in secondary school, for boys and girls 
      Boys    Girls 












                   
Secondary enrollment  0.653        0.528     
                   
Without supply side               








               
With supply side               








  Distance to school (kilometers)    -0.079 
(6.68) 
    -0.114 
(7.83) 
  Distance squared    0.004 
(3.73) 
    0.007 
(3.35) 
  School is telesecondary    -0.098 
(1.70) 
    -0.138 
(2.74) 
  Percent teachers with high 
school degree 
  0.30 
(0.40) 
    0.176 
(2.53) 
  Percent students failing    -0.020 
(0.11) 
    -0.243 
(1.38) 
Child/teacher ratio    -0.002 
(1.71) 
    -0.0007 
(0.63) 
           
Note: These estimates are generated by double-difference regression analysis of individual-level data. 
 
 
What is the intuition behind the result that the impact of program participation is 
not reduced through the inclusion of supply-side variables? Note that it does not 
necessarily imply that the program has not been accompanied by an improvement in   18
supply in the communities where it operates. In fact, the results suggest a story in which 
supply improved in treatment communities but also in control communities. This is 
supported by our earlier descriptive analysis, which showed some improvement in 
supply-side characteristics in both treatment and control communities. As previously 
shown, in both control and treatment communities, average distance to the nearest 
secondary school has decreased by 10 percent between 1997 and 1999. Given the 
proximity of treatment and control communities, it would in fact be difficult to improve 
services in treatment communities without improving services for control students, 
because in many cases, they are attending the same schools.  
Table 3 reports the estimated impacts of the supply-side variables we have 
included in our regressions. Most importantly, for both boys and girls, distance to 
secondary school has a consistently large and negative effect on the probability of 
enrolling in secondary school. The impact is, in general, much larger for girls than for 
boys. For girls, a reduction in distance to the nearest secondary school of 1 kilometer 
from the current mean of about 2 kilometers would result in an increase in the probability 
of attending by approximately 8.6 percentage points, whereas for boys, the corresponding 
increase would be approximately 6.3 percentage points.
10 
                                                 
10 Based on the baseline ENCASEH97 data, just over 30 percent of children under 18 years old (17 percent 
of localities) who completed primary school (and are thus eligible to go attend secondary school) have a 
secondary school in their community. Among those without a school in their community, the average 
distance traveled to and from school each day was 3.7km, taking on average nearly 100 minutes and 
costing nearly $10. The average annual travel cost was nearly $316, or nearly 15 percent of the average 
education subsidy received by households.   19
When the closest secondary school is a telesecondary school, as opposed to a 
general or technical secondary school, this is associated with a large reduction in the 
probability of attending school of the order of 10–14 percentage points (although, for 
boys, the coefficient is barely significant at the 10 percent level). Nevertheless, this may 
be an overestimate if telesecondary schools are placed precisely in areas with poor 
enrollment and attendance rates. As mentioned earlier, this variable may also be 
correlated with other omitted characteristics of the community. Our measure of human 
capital of the teachers has a positive and significant effect on school enrollment for girls 
only. Finally, with respect to the potential student-teacher ratio, this has a negative and 
significant effect (at the 10 percent level) only for boys.  
In summary, our impact analysis has shown large impacts of PROGRESA on 
secondary school enrollment, particularly for girls. By including supply variables in our 
regression analysis, we can interpret these impacts as largely reflecting the impact of the 
educational grants, rather than improvements on the supply side. With regard to the 
supply-side variables, the analysis has shown that the most consistent and important 
determinant of school enrollment at the secondary school level is distance, with larger 
negative effects on girls than boys. Our results on the impact of other school quality 
variables show mixed results, with few variables significant at more than the 10 percent 
level (quite weak, given our number of observations) and rarely affecting enrollment 
levels. In the rest of the paper, we concentrate on a comparison of the cost-effectiveness 
of education grants with the policy of reducing distance by constructing new schools. 
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5. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
We now present the results of our cost-effectiveness analysis, which integrates the 
impact analysis with the cost side. We start by translating our impact estimates into extra 
years of schooling generated by the program. We then combine the effectiveness 
measures with costs to calculate the cost of achieving an extra year of schooling, which 
we compare across the demand- and supply-side components of the program. 
 
EFFECTIVENESS 
We measure the effectiveness of the education grants in terms of extra years of 
schooling generated, separately for boys and girls. We also calculate the effectiveness of 
the construction of new schools, which decreases the distance to the nearest school and 
thereby increases enrollment. As discussed earlier, we adopt an indirect method for 
calculating extra years of schooling, i.e., we use the impact on the enrollment rate and 
assume that an extra year of enrollment is equivalent to an extra year of education. 
In order to identify the impact of the program on years of schooling, we ask how 
many extra years of schooling a cohort of 1,000 children would receive. This is derived 
as the difference between the total years of schooling they would receive after the 
program (i.e., given the higher enrollment rates) compared to before the program. 
Consistent with the regression analysis, we focus on conditional enrollment rates, i.e., the 
enrollment rates conditional on having reached a certain grade level. For example, a 
conditional enrollment rate of 0.3 in grade 7 implies that 30 percent of those children who   21
complete primary school (i.e., the first six grades) continue in school and enroll in junior 
secondary school.  
Our measure of effectiveness is based on the impact estimates derived above. The 
regression coefficient on the program dummy gives an estimate of the impact of the 
program on the average conditional enrollment rate (S) in the sample of children whose 
maximum grades achieved lie between grades 6 and 8 so that they are eligible to enroll in 
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where Ri is the conditional enrollment rate for grade i. We assume that the enrollment 
impact is concentrated in the transition year from primary school (i.e., impacts only on 
grade 7), consistent with the pattern shown in Figures 1 and 2 comparing conditional 
enrollment rates in both control and treatment localities (for boys and girls separately) 
based on ENCEL98.
11 Where in the grade structure one allocates the impact is important, 
both because allocating it earlier means that the effect lasts for more years, thus giving 
                                                 
11 Specifically, using conditional enrollment rates before the program, we calculate the total number of 
years of education for a cohort of 1 ,000 children ( Y0) and use this to calculate an average conditional 
enrollment rate before the program as S0 = (Y0/1,000). The average conditional rate after the program is 
then calculated as S1 = S0 + P, where P is estimated program impact. We then calculate the total number of 
years of education after the program as Y1 = Y0(S1/S0) and allocate these to grade 7 to arrive at a new 
conditional enrollment rate of  R
*
7 = (Y1 - Y0)/1000. The results were not significantly altered by 
alternatively assuming that the impact is distributed evenly throughout the three years of secondary school.   22
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higher impact estimates, but also because the grant amounts differ by grade level. With 




Table 4 presents the results separately for boys (first four columns) and girls 
(second four columns). The first column gives enrollment rates before the program, taken 
from the baseline data. The second column presents the program impact on enrollment 
rates based on our regression estimates, adjusted so that all of the effect is concentrated in 
the transition year from primary school. The third column presents the enrollment rates 
after the program, which are simply the sum of the first two columns. The final column 
calculates the extra years of schooling attributed to the program as the difference between 
the third and first columns applied to a cohort of 1,000 children starting in the first grade 
of secondary school. 
 
Table 4—Impact of education grants on extra years of secondary education, for 
boys and girls 
  Boys conditional enrollment    Girls conditional enrollment 
  Before  Impact  After 
Extra 
years    Before  Impact  After 
Extra 
years 
                   
Grade                   
7  0.345  0.094  0.440  94.5    0.265  0.198  0.463  198.3 
8  0.903  0.000  0.903  85.3    0.895  0.000  0.895  177.5 
9  0.866  0.000  0.866  73.8    0.879  0.000  0.879  156.1 
                  
Total        253.8          531.9 
   24
The conditional enrollment rates across grades show a clear pattern for both boys 
and girls: only 27 percent of girls and 35 percent of boys who finish primary school go on 
to enroll in junior secondary school, but thereafter a very high percentage (86–90 percent) 
continue into the other two years. The regression estimates of 0.057 and 0.132 for boys 
and girls, respectively,
12 translate into increases in conditional enrollment rates of 0.094 
and 0.198, respectively, when concentrated in grade 7, the transition year from primary 
school. For a representative cohort of 1,000 boys and 1,000 girls, these estimates imply 
254 and 532 extra years of schooling for boys and girls, respectively, a clear bias in favor 
of girls and sufficient to nearly equalize average conditional enrollment rates in 




Simultaneous to the program transfers, there has been an expansion of the supply 
side of education. Here we are specifically concerned with expansion on the extensive 
margin (i.e., more schools) rather than on the intensive margin (i.e., improvements in the 
quality of education). The former manifests itself through a decline in the distance to the 
                                                 
12 We use the program impact estimates from 1999, which are substantially smaller for boys and slightly 
larger for girls compared to those in 1998. For boys, this may be an overestimate if one expects this impact 
to fall even further over time. However, as progression rates to secondary school improve due to the 
program, impact may increase over time. For example, take a  14-year-old boy who leaves school after 
grade 6 (primary completion) and so is three years out of school when the program is implemented. 
Because of his age relative to most of those in grade 6 (14 versus 12 years old), he may decide not to take 
up the program. The program will reduce these age gaps over time and so one expects more 14 year olds to 
enroll over time.    25
nearest school. As indicated earlier, since children from both control and treatment 
localities very often attend the same schools, we find that both groups experience similar 
declines in the average distance to the nearest school over our sample period. We use the 
entire sample (both treatment and control group) for the purpose of our analysis. 
Analysis of the distance variable indicates that the average distance has decreased 
from about 2.2 kilometers in 1997 to 2.1 kilometers in 1998 and 2.00 kilometers in 1999. 
To estimate the impact of these decreases on enrollment rates, we use the coefficients on 
distance (and its square) from the regressions presented earlier in Table 3 and calculate 
the change in the probability of enrollment (dS) as 
 
dS = -0.079 + (2*0.004) D    (for boys) , 
dS = -0.114 + (2*0.007) D    (for girls) , 
where D is the distance (in kilometers) to the nearest school in 1997. Then, dS is 
multiplied by the actual change in distance to get the change in enrollment due to 
extensive expansion. This is calculated for each individual in the sample and averaged to 
get the expected impact on enrollment. When the enrollment impacts are concentrated on 
the transition year (Table 5), a cohort of 1,000 girls entering grade 7 will receive 27 extra 
years of education in junior secondary school as a result of the combined decrease in 
distance from 1997–1999. Reflecting the timing of school constructions (and thus 
decreases in distance), the majority of this impact occurs in 1998 (17 extra years). The 
corresponding numbers for boys are 25 extra years, with 14 of these occurring in 1998.   26
Table 5—Effect of decreasing distance on enrollment (allocated to transition year) 
      Enrollment    Extra years of education 
  Grade    Before  Impact98  Impact99    1997-8  1998-9  1997-9 
                  
Girls   7    0.265  0.006  0.004    6.46  3.76  10.22 
  8    0.895  0.000  0.000    5.78  3.36   9.14 
  9    0.879  0.000  0.000    5.08  2.96  8.04 
Total              17.33  10.07  27.40 
                   
Boys   7    0.345  0.004  0.004    3.70  4.41  8.10 
  8    0.903  0.000  0.000    6.83  3.39   9.22 
  9    0.866  0.000  0.000    5.01  2.91  7.92 




We now address the issue of the cost of generating the above impacts. We 
calculate separately the cost per extra year of schooling generated by schooling subsidies 
and school construction for both boys and girls. Table 6 presents the calculation of the 
cost of an extra year of schooling in the case of education subsidies. Since the education 
subsidy is paid to all those that enroll, we calculate the total cost of generating the total 
impacts identified above by multiplying the total enrollment by grade after the program 
for the cohort of 1,000 children by the appropriate subsidy rate as presented in Table 1. 
We then sum across the appropriate grades. This number is then divided by the extra 
years of schooling generated by the subsidies to get the cost per extra year of schooling.
13 
                                                 
13 Notice that there are two forces pulling cost-effectiveness ratios (CERs) for grants in opposing 
directions. On the one hand, the fact that children only receive the grant if they attend school tends to 
reduce the CER. On the other, the fact that all children attending school  receive grants, regardless of 
whether they would have done so in the absence of grants, tends to increase the CER.   27
The cost per extra year of schooling is $12,557 for boys and $6,904 for girls.
14 Note that 
the higher enrollment effect for girls easily offsets their higher grant levels. 
 
Table 6—Cost of extra years of education through secondary grants 
    Secondary 
    Boys  Girls  Average 
         
Total enrollment  1,181  1,243  1,212 
         
Total impact  254  532  393 
         
Grants    3,184,059  3,671,964  3,428,012 
         
Cost per year  12,557  6,904   9,730 
 
 
We can now compare the cost of generating an extra year of schooling using 
subsidies with that of building new schools. Using the merged school supply and 
household dataset, we calculate that in both 1998 and 1999, six new schools were built 
compared to the previous year (Table 7).
15 The number of different types of schools in 
the sample is the number of separate schools attended by the sample children. When the 
school located closest to the community changes, we assume this is due to the building of 
a new school nearer to the locality. A school added to the sample is thus considered to be 
                                                 
14 We also made the same calculation for primary school grants and find higher CERs of $22,552 for boys 
and $26,331 for girls. 
15 This calculation is based on observations of the number of schools that were constructed within the 
evaluation communities. It is also possible that distance to secondary school was reduced by construction 
of schools outside of the evaluation communities. This would increase the estimated costs (but not affect 
impact) so that our estimate of costs for reducing distance to school should be considered a lower-bound 
estimate.    28
a newly built school, although we assume the old school still exists. In 1998, four of these 
were telesecondaries and two were technical secondaries. In 1999, all six new schools 
were technical secondaries.  
 
Table 7—Number of new schools in evaluation sample 
  Number of secondary schools    Number of new schools 
School type  1997  1998  1999    1998  1999 
             
General secondary  18  16  16    -2  0 
Workers’ secondary  2  2  1    0  -1 
Technical secondary  27  29  35    +2  +6 
Telesecondary  434  438  436    +4  -2 
               
Number of new schools          6  6 
Note: Technical secondary includes a category “alternative types.” The number of secondary schools is 
the number of the different types attended by children in the sample. When a school disappears 
from the sample, it is assumed to be because children now go to another school (possibly a new 
school). So we count only the schools added to the sample. 
 
 
The cost of building and operating such schools is presented in Table 8. 
Infrastructure and equipment costs are about $1.38 million for telesecondary schools and 
about $2.4 million for technical secondary schools. Personnel and operating costs are 
$170,000 per year for telesecondary schools versus $427,000 for technical secondary 
schools. Personnel and operating costs are assumed to recur every year, while furniture 
and equipment and infrastructure are assumed to be fixed, up-front costs. 
The cost of generating an extra year of education (i.e., the cost-effectiveness ratio, 
CER) through extensive expansion of the school system is presented in Table 9 for boys   29
Table 8—Cost of school construction (1999 pesos) 
Item  Telesecondary    Technical secondary 
       
Personnel  169,624    426,356 
Operating costs  302    718 
Furniture and equipment  20,576    44,771 
Infrastructure  1,360,000    2,400,000 
       
Total  1,550,502    2,871,845 
 
 
Table 9—Cost-effectiveness ratios for school building 
    r = 0%    r = 5% 
    20 Years  30 Years  40 Years    20 Years  30 Years  40 Years 
               
Girls 1997-98  118,575  108,560  103,552    136,749  127,620  123,550 
Girls 1998-99  327,174  302,905  290,771    371,211  349,090  339,228 
Girls 1997-99  195,268  180,013  172,385    222,951  209,046  202,846 
                 
Boys 1997-98  141,357  129,417  123,447    163,023  152,140  147,287 
Boys 1998-99  307,758  284,930  273,515    349,181  328,374  319,097 
Boys 1997-99  211,952  195,393  187,113    242,000  226,907  220,177 
                 
Average 1997-98  129,966  118,989  113,500    149,886  139,880  135,419 
Average 1998-99  317,466  293,917  282,143    360,196  338,732  329,162 
Average 1997-99  203,610  187,703  179,749    232,476  217,976  211,511 
 
 
and girls separately and with and without discounting. We also consider different 
scenarios with respect to how long the school will “last” before requiring additional 
investment. The table presents estimates for both years, which differ according to how 
many and which type of secondary schools was constructed. A number of points emerge 
from the table. First, the cost decreases the longer one assumes that the extensive supply 
effect to last, reflecting the fact that up-front infrastructure costs are spread over a longer   30
period. Second, the cost decreases as the discount rate increases, reflecting the fact that a 
greater proportion of the enrollment is distributed further in time relative to costs. Third, 
the cost is lower for girls than for boys, reflecting the larger effect of lower distances on 
girls’ enrollment relative to boys’. Fourth, the cost increases over time, reflecting the fact 
that telesecondary schools are cheaper to build relative to technical secondaries and the 
majority of new schools in 1998 were telesecondaries (four of six), whereas all six new 
schools in 1999 were technical secondaries. Also, the effect of new schools on average 
distance is lower in 1999 relative to 1998. 
Comparing the cost-effectiveness of education subsidies with that of extensive 
expansion, it is clear that education subsidies are a substantially more cost-effective 
method of increasing the number of children enrolled in school. The lowest CER for 
extensive expansion is for a 40-year period of impact on girls’ enrollment with zero 
discounting at just below $103,600 per extra year of schooling. The largest CER in the 
case of secondary education subsidies was just over $12,600 for boys. Therefore, when 
combined with the fact that the parameters we have used were, if anything, biased against 
the demand-side, our conclusion that the demand-side program is a cost-effective way of 
getting more children into secondary school would seem to be quite robust. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have been concerned with evaluating the relative cost-
effectiveness of two policy instruments aimed at increasing enrollment rates in junior   31
secondary school in poor communities in rural Mexico. The two policy instruments are 
(1) demand-side subsidies in the form of monetary transfers conditioned on children’s 
enrollment in school and (2) supply-side expansion through building more schools. The 
former has its effect through increasing the private benefit from schooling, while the 
latter has its effect through decreasing the private cost of schooling associated with the 
time and money costs of traveling to and from school. We have presented results that 
show that, in this context, demand-side policies are a much more cost-effective 
instrument than the alternative of expansion on the supply side. The large differences in 
cost-effectiveness ratios between grants versus school construction suggest that this result 
is likely to be fairly robust.  
We are aware that we have focused only on two very specific alternatives, which 
furthermore represent the policies actually pursued by the government and not 
necessarily the optimal policy (e.g., perhaps schools were built in the “wrong” locations). 
Therefore, our results should not be broadly interpreted to mean that demand-side 
interventions are the only attractive alternative in terms of increasing enrollment rates. 
Other more focused instruments may exist on the supply side that might be cost-effective 
in specific environments. For example, given the importance of distance in secondary 
school, especially for girls, improving transport conditions to and from secondary schools 
may be an attractive policy option. Further analyses of this type should be pursued using 
alternative indicators and in other contexts to analyze the extent to which our conclusions 
may be more generalizable. The analysis done here does, however, provide a useful   32
model of the type that should be a prerequisite to the allocation of scarce resources in the 
important area of education. 
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